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Quantitative studies of the presidential use of executive orders have attempted to 
determine whether presidents are more prone to resort to unilateral action when faced with 
legislative opposition. To date, the results have been mixed however, with studies demonstrating 
that the type of executive order is an important factor in understanding the conditions under 
which presidents will resort to unilateral action. Despite this advancement in theory, there has 
been little consensus regarding the actual conditions under which presidents will issue the 
different types of executive orders that have been identified in the literature. 
This thesis addresses this puzzle through an empirical analysis that engages the "Two 
Presidencies Thesis," which argues that presidential decision-making, action and success 
is conditioned by policy area (foreign and domestic) and executive order type (major, routine, or 
symbolic). An original dataset was constructed by coding all executive orders issued between 
1953 and 2008 as related to either foreign or domestic policy. Thus, an analysis is undertaken of 
major executive orders, minor executive orders, foreign policy-based executive orders, domestic 
policy-based executive orders, and major and minor categories of each policy area. 
A multivariate analysis is completed using negative binomial regression given that the 
dependent variables are overdispersed count variables.  The effects of divided government and 
ideological distance are the primary independent variables examined. The ideological distance 
variable consists of the absolute distance between the president's ideology and the ideology of 
the median member of the Senate. Various other control variables are included, including 
presidential party, election year, and approval ratings. The findings indicate that executive order 
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type does matter in predicting presidential use of executive orders and that the prevailing 
political climate does influence the president’s use of executive orders.  
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 On November 20, 2014 President Barack Obama announced a series of executive actions 
designed to carry out his immigration plan (Shear 2014). Obama rolled out the plan with a series 
of speeches, the issuance of presidential memoranda, and a website on which he displayed his 
strategy for reforming U.S. immigration policy, along with his justification for doing so (Obama 
2014). The rhetoric that surrounded this action, from Republicans, Democrats, and the media, 
reflected many of the issues explored, and debated, by students of the presidential use of 
unilateral action.  
 The media coverage of this initiative described Obama’s actions as a challenge to 
Congress to act, questioned the legality of the presidents actions, and frequently referred to the 
president’s frustration over Congressional gridlock (Eilperin, O’Keefe, and Zezima 2014; Fitz 
2014; Shear 2014). These depictions mirror certain aspects of the literature on presidential 
unilateral action; some scholars have argued that president may use unilateral action to prod 
Congress to act or to move legislation being considered in Congress closer to the president’s 
ideal point (Deering and Maltzman 1999; Howell 2003). Other scholars have examined the 
implications of presidential executive action including the sources of its legitimacy (Cooper 
1986; Bailey and Rottinghaus 2013). The passage of legislation, particularly in times of gridlock, 
has been well studied (Binder 2003; Bond and Fleisher 2000; Brady and Volden 2005; Mayhew 
1991). These studies have been extended to evaluations of presidential strategies for breaking 
policy gridlock (Brady and Volden 2005; Fine and Warber 2012).               
The administration, and its supporters, made it a point to state that they would prefer 
immigration reform via legislation, but that months of Congressional inaction left the president 
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with no choice other than to act (Eilperin, O’Keefe, and Zezima 2014). The reasons given for the 
president’s decision to act alone are reflective of many of the arguments in the unilateral models 
literature. The literature argues that presidents prefer the permanence of legislation but will use 
executive action on issues of importance to them if they believe that it is the best way to 
overcome perceived gridlock in Congress (Deering and Maltzman 1999; Mayer 2010). 
Other studies of the presidential use of unilateral action have highlighted the importance 
of public opinion in determining presidential use of unilateral action (Krause and Cohen 1997; 
Mayer and Price 2002). The Office of the Press Secretary (2014), exhibited a keen awareness of 
the importance of public support for the president’s initiative when they put together a website 
that not only summarized the president’s plan, but also grounded his decision to take executive 
action in historical and legal precedent. 
The terminology used by opponents of the president’s plan was representative of specific 
questions that have been addressed in the literature. Some of the opposition challenged both the 
wisdom and legality of the president’s actions (Eilperin, O’Keefe, and Zezima 2014; Fitz 2014; 
Shear 2014). Others chose to threaten the legacy of the president by promising a lack of 
cooperation on any legislation that was important to him in the final two years of his presidency 
(Eilperin, O’Keefe, and Zezima 2014; Shear 2014). Scholars who have studied presidential use 
of executive action have attempted to measure the president’s concern with legacy in multiple 
ways including accounting for new presidents, presidents who are campaigning for reelection, 
and those who are at the end of an eight year term (Bailey and Rottinghaus 2013; Deering and 
Maltzman 1999; Mayer 1999).  
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This scenario, involving the president’s actions on U.S. immigration policy, is quite 
interesting because it consists of so many parts of one of the most significant puzzles in the study 
of the President of the United States, namely, the source of the president’s power. Furthermore, it 
highlights the question of whether presidents are strategic actors who use executive action to 
achieve their policy goals or are political actors whose power arises from their ability to 
negotiate with, and influence, other political actors.      
 
Competing Models of Presidential Power 
 
For a significant portion of the second half of the twentieth century, Richard Neustadt’s 
model of presidential bargaining was the dominant theoretical framework for studies of the 
American presidency (Mayer 2010; Waterman 2010). Neustadt argues that presidents do not 
have the power to command; therefore, they must rely on their ability to bargain with, or 
persuade, other political elites in order to achieve their policy goals. The effectiveness of this 
persuasive power is measured by the president’s ability to strategically influence other political 
actors in such a way that it results in the president having influence when he wants it, or needs it, 
rather than in a specific moment (Neustadt 1990). In this way, Neustadt’s definition of power is 
forward-thinking in that it requires the president to continually develop, and nurture, positive 
working relationships with other political actors. Based on this definition of power, Neustadt 
views unilateral actions by the president as a “forced response to the exhaustion of other 
remedies, suggestive less of mastery than of failure” (Neustadt 1990, 24).  
 Neustadt’s book, Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents, was originally 
published in 1960 and has undergone multiple updates since that time to account for changes in 
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the political environment. However, the overall premise of Neustadt’s argument remains the 
same: that presidents must effectively use their powers of persuasion to be successful. In the 
mid-1980’s, political scientists began to challenge Neustadt’s theory based on developments that 
were taking place in the structure of the presidency (Moe 2009). They argued that Neustadt’s 
approach was decidedly personal and did not account for the increasing institutionalization of the 
presidency (Mayer 2010; Moe and Howell 1999). The political world Neustadt’s model is 
grounded in does not exist for contemporary presidents. Increasing polarization among political 
elites and the electorate (Binder 2003; Bond, Fleisher [Eds.] 2000), increasing media scrutiny, 
and increasingly aggressive interest groups have negatively impacted the ability of the president 
to form coalitions and negotiate with other political actors (Waterman 2010).  
 The extent to which political scientists have challenged Neustadt’s theory varies. 
Initially, the institutional-based approaches functioned more as an extension of Neustadt’s theory 
rather than a direct challenge (Mayer 2010). Gradually, the shift to institutional based theories 
led to a sharper focus on unilateral action and a redefining of presidential power, which served as 
a more direct challenge to Neustadt’s bargaining model. Mayer and Price (2002) argue that 
Neustadt’s definition of power is based on a false dichotomy. They argue that the separation 
“between ‘formal power’ and ‘persuasion’ is artificial; the two categories are neither mutually 
exclusive nor exhaustive of all possible avenues of presidential influence” (Mayer and Price 
2002, 370). Howell’s (2003) definition of presidential power abandons Neustadt’s policy 
implementation requirement altogether and focuses instead on the president’s ability to impact 
the content of public policy.  
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 The institutional approach to the study of the presidency has led to the development of 
the strategic school, which is influenced heavily by rational choice models (Moe and Howell 
2009). This approach has allowed scholars to model the conditions under which presidents will 
resort to unilateral action and what constraints will prevent them from doing so. Some of the 
concerns that guide this school of thought are: are presidents strategic actors who take advantage 
of times of congressional gridlock to implement policy through the use of executive orders? Or, 
do presidents take advantage of favorable times, such as unified government, when there is little 
risk of challenge to their executive orders? There is also a focus on whether issues such as public 
approval or party affiliation impact the president’s use of executive orders.  
Much of the work in this field has been concerned with the impact of divided government 
on the use of executive orders (Deering and Maltzman 1999; Edwards 2009; Mayer 1999; 
Warber 2006). The findings regarding the impact of divided government have been mixed, but 
ultimately led to the development of two innovations in how presidential use of executive orders 
would be studied: the first was the use of ideology scores to measure the distance between the 
president and Congress (Deering and Maltzman 1999). The second advancement was 
disaggregating the executive orders into major and minor categories (Fine and Warber 2012; 
Warber 2006). Although many important advancements have emerged from the findings in these 
studies, there is a need to develop improved methods for measuring the concepts of interest. 
 
Advancements in Concept Measurement 
 
This thesis will contribute to the study of the president’s use of executive orders in two 
primary ways. First, it will analyze the two presidencies thesis to develop a more precise 
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measurement of the types of executive orders that the president issues. Second, it will use 
Bailey’s ideal point estimate scores to measure the preferred policy position of the president and 
the median Senate member. These two adjustments will advance our understanding of the 
political conditions that lead to the president using executive orders rather than passing 
legislation through the traditional Congressional process. This study will then use multivariate 
analysis to evaluate the impact of these more precise categorizations and measurements on the 
use of executive orders.     
Prior studies have separated executive orders into categories denoting whether they are 
significant orders or routine orders (Fine and Warber 2012; Mayer 1999; Warber 2006). The 
terminology differs across these studies but the concepts are the same. This thesis will build upon 
Warber’s approach by incorporating categories to denote foreign policy and domestic policy. To 
build upon the prior categorizations of executive orders this thesis will incorporate Wildavky’s 
(1966; 1998) two presidencies thesis to create categories representing major executive orders, 
minor executive orders, foreign policy-based executive orders, domestic policy-based executive 
orders, and major and minor categories of each policy area. 
Wildavsky (1996; 1998) argues that there are two presidencies; one for foreign policy 
and one for domestic policy. His two presidencies thesis states that presidents generally enjoy 
comparatively more congressional support for their foreign policy initiatives, but struggle to gain 
congressional support for their domestic policies. Because the strategic model posits that 
presidents will use executive orders to circumvent roadblocks in Congress it is necessary to 
examine executive orders in the context of domestic and foreign policy. If presidents are facing 
less resistance for their foreign policy initiatives under both unified and divided government, or 
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regardless of their ideological differences with Congress, then analyzing domestic policy and 
foreign policy-based executive orders as a single variable could skew the findings as it relates to 
either divided government or ideological differences. In other words, the differences in 
presidential behavior logically extend beyond a simple major/minor dichotomy into policy area. 
 Prior studies that have taken the ideological differences between the president and 
Congress into account have relied on NOMINATE or ADA scores. This thesis will build upon 
those results by using Bailey’s ideal point estimates (Bailey 2007; 2011) to determine the 
absolute difference between the president and the median Senate member. Bailey’s estimates are 
a more appropriate measurement to use for this type of analysis because they are comparable 
across time and institution, whereas the NOMINATE and ADA scores are not as effective of a 
measurement of this concept across time and institution (Bailey 2007; 2011). The use of an 
appropriate cross-temporal and cross-institution measure will allow for greater confidence in the 
results and thereby contribute to our understanding of presidential unilateral action in relation to 




 The research question this thesis will address is whether presidents are comparatively 
more likely to resort to unilateral action when faced with legislative opposition. The question 
will be addressed under two scenarios: first, a multivariate analysis will be specified to test the 
president’s use of executive orders under divided government. For the purposes of this thesis, 
divided government will be disaggregated into variables denoting pure divided government (both 
houses of Congress are controlled by a different party than the president’s party), mixed 
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government (one house of Congress is controlled by a different party than the president’s party), 
and unified government. This approach is taken to account for varying degrees of contention 
between the president and a Congress where he presumably has very little support (pure 
divided), a Congress where he has some support (mixed government), and a Congress where 
there would be an expectation of widespread support (unified government) (Godwin and Ilderton 
2014). As a test of the unilateral powers model, this methodology has distinct advantages over a 
simple unified/divided government dummy variable because it accounts for variation in the level 
of constraint that the president faces and should therefore better model the conditions that lead to 
the use of executive orders.   
 The second scenario that will be tested via multivariate analysis will be based on the 
ideological distance between the president and the median Senate member. It is theorized that as 
the ideological distance between the president and the median Senate member increases, the 
president will face greater resistance in trying to pass legislation. Due to the increased opposition 
to the president’s legislative agenda, the president (if the unilateral powers model holds true) 
should react by increasing the use of executive orders (Deering and Maltzman 1999). This model 
has advantages over the divided government model in that it is a more precise measurement of 
the potential constraints that the president may face. The disadvantage of this approach is that 
there is a subjective element to the scores that does not exist in the divided government variable. 
The condition of divided, mixed, or unified government is easily observable, whereas ideology 
scores only capture particular behaviors (such as votes) that could be influenced by unobservable 
pressures on a political actor that may not influence the person’s behavior subsequently. This is a 
minor concern as there is typically a large sample size to calculate an ideology score, meaning it 
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is fairly representative of a political actor’s ideology, but, again, it is not as straightforward as 
divided government. 
 This thesis will argue that under divided government, presidents will issue more major 
executive orders and more major domestic policy-based executive orders to overcome legislative 
constraints. It is also argued that the wider the ideological gap is between the president and the 
median Senate member, the more frequently the president will issue major executive orders and 
major domestic policy-based executive orders. These arguments are consistent with the 
assumptions outlined above regarding the president’s strategic use of executive powers and 




 To test the theoretical expectations discussed above, two multivariate analyses using 
executive orders issued between 1953 and 2008 as the dependent variable were specified and 
estimated. Because the dependent variable in this study is an overdispersed count variable (the 
annual number of executive orders), negative binomial regression is used to test the arguments 
(Cameron 1998). Negative binomial regression handles overdispersed count data better than a 
simple Poisson regression; therefore, it is the appropriate method to use. To test each model, 
divided government and the ideological gap, the dependent variable was disaggregated further 
into major/minor and foreign/domestic categories as noted above. In the first model, divided and 
mixed government were the primary independent variables. In the second model, the absolute 
value of the difference in ideology scores between the president and the median Senator was the 
primary independent variable. A series of control variables, including approval rating, major 
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events, Democratic president, election year, and a new president were added to the regression 
based on the findings of various prior studies. 
 The dataset used in this thesis is an original dataset that was compiled from various 
sources. The ideal point estimates are taken from Bailey (2007; 2011). The major, minor, and 
symbolic executive order counts are taken from Warber (2006) and Fine and Warber (2012). The 
divided/mixed/unified government coding was done through original research. The foreign 
policy and domestic policy counts were coded by the researcher through a review of the 
language of each executive order that the president issued from 1953 to 2008. The executive 
order language was obtained from The American Presidency Project (Peters 2015). 
 The thesis will demonstrate that in the case of executive orders, specificity is important to 
determining the use of unilateral action by the president. There is, of course, the danger of losing 
meaning through the use of overly specific categories however; aggregating all executive orders 
together, with no regard for their content, is not the most valid way to evaluate their use either. 
Prior studies have taken the important step of examining these major and minor categories. This 




CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW 
Unilateral Powers Theory 
 
 Following its publishing in 1960 Richard Neustadt’s Presidential Power held a uniquely 
preeminent role in the field of presidential studies for more than 40 years (Moe 2009). Neustadt 
(1960; 1990) argues that presidents do not have the power to command; therefore, in order to 
achieve their policy goals, presidents must rely on their ability to bargain with other political 
elites. Neustadt’s definition of presidential power is decidedly informal and personal in nature. It 
treats each president as an individual and views unilateral action as a, “forced response to the 
exhaustion of other remedies, suggestive less of mastery than of failure” (Neustadt 1990, 24). 
During the 1990s, the field of presidential studies underwent a transformation in which scholars 
began to develop theories that would address the realities of the modern presidency with more 
analytical rigor than did Neustadt’s personality-based approach (Mayer 2010; Moe 2009). 
Increasing institutionalization (Moe and Howell 1999), increasing polarization among political 
elites and the electorate (Binder 2003; Bond and Fleisher [Eds.] 2000), increasing media 
scrutiny, and increasingly aggressive interest groups (Waterman 2010) marked the modern 
presidency. Neustadt’s approach lacks the tools to evaluate the impact of these changes on 
presidential behavior. 
 To contend with these changes in the relationship between the president and other actors, 
the field of presidential studies adopted an institutional approach, which led to the development 
of the unilateral powers theory. This theory rejects the notion that power is personality based 
(Edwards 2009). The unilateral powers model is built on two basic assumptions (Mayer 2010). 
The first assumption is not concerned with presidents as individual personality types, but as 
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“generic types” functioning within a system in which their “powers and incentives are 
institutionally determined” (Moe 2009, 704). The second assumption is that presidential success 
or failure in aligning policy with their preferences is a result of the legal authority granted by the 
Constitution and Congress, not the president’s relative ability to persuade other political actors to 
enact his policy agenda (Mayer 2010).   
 Unilateral powers theory examines, among other actions, presidential use of executive 
orders, signing statements, military orders, proclamations, National Security Directives, and 
recess appointments (Fine and Warber 2012; Mayer 2010). Despite the president having these 
tools at his disposal, unilateral power theory does not argue that presidents have free license to 
act unilaterally (Mayer 1999; 2001). There are limitations on the extent to which presidents can, 
and will, use unilateral action. One constraint on the use of unilateral action is that, ultimately, 
presidents should, theoretically, prefer that their policies be enacted through legislation because 
of the permanence legislation entails, as opposed to the inherent temporary nature of executive 
orders (Deering and Maltzman 1999; Mayer 2010). Presidents are aware of the fact that 
unilateral action can be overturned by the unilateral actions of a subsequent president or 
challenges from the other branches of government (Deering and Maltzman 1999; Howell 2003). 
Presidents also have to consider factors such as protecting allies, prior governmental 
commitments, maintaining services, and protecting rights when taking unilateral action (Edwards 
and Wayne 1985). Presidents are also constrained by the potential costs, in light of the potential 
benefits, of taking unilateral action (Moe and Howell 1999). The overarching goal of unilateral 
power theory is to explain when, and how, presidents will use the unilateral powers at their 
disposal.  
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The Strategic Model 
 
 One of the most studied aspects of presidential behavior in the unilateral powers literature 
is the impact of divided government on presidential use of executive orders (Fine and Warber 
2012). A significant portion of the literature focuses on the “strategic model”, which posits that a 
president is more likely to rely on executive orders during periods of divided government 
(Deering and Maltzman 1999). The most successful presidents, under this model, “evaluate 
strategic positions correctly” (Edwards 2009, 190). Unfortunately, the literature on this topic has 
not provided clarity regarding the relationship between divided government and presidential use 
of executive orders. Some studies have demonstrated that presidents will resort to the use of 
executive orders when facing a hostile Congress (Deering and Maltzman 1999). Other studies 
have found that factors other than divided government, such as approval ratings and 
manipulation of his base of support, explain the presidents increased use of executive orders 
(Mayer 1999; 2001; Mayer and Price 2002; Warber 2006). 
 The strategic model’s focus on the relationship between executive orders and divided 
government has a considerable presence in the unilateral powers literature. The impact of divided 
government on policy gridlock became a popular topic in political science following Mayhew’s 
(1991) finding that the passage of significant legislation was not negatively impacted by the 
presence of divided government. Multiple subsequent studies reported that divided government 
does in fact lead to policy gridlock (Binder 2003; Bond and Fleisher 2000; Brady and Volden 
2005). Because presidents have policy agendas they want to enact, they have an incentive to seek 
methods for breaking, or taking advantage of, legislative gridlock (Brady and Volden 2005; Fine 
and Warber 2012). Executive orders are one method by which presidents can accomplish this 
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goal. Theoretically, divided government may lead to an increase in presidential unilateral action 
because, under divided government, the president will have a more difficult time gaining votes 
for his policies, thereby limiting his success; and, because under divided government it is more 
likely that the president and Congress will hold divergent viewpoints (Fine and Warber 2012). 
Although the president has a variety of unilateral actions available to circumvent policy 
gridlock, executive orders have remained the primary focus in the literature. The primary reason 
for this focus is that executive orders, “present the clearest alternative presidents have to the 
legislative process” (Howell 2003, xvi). Second, unlike many of the other unilateral tools 
available to the president, executive orders cover a wide range of policy areas (Howell 2003). 
Two other reasons that they have been studied so extensively have to do with research concerns. 
Executive orders are more likely to garner attention from the media than other types of unilateral 
action, thereby making their impact easier to evaluate (Waterman 2010). Also, they are easily 
referenced as they have been consistently numbered and cataloged since the Federal Register Act 
of 1935 (Howell 2003; Warber 2006). Although there are gaps in the Federal Register’s record of 
executive orders, a majority of them are publically available and they are not subject to being 
deemed classified as are other types of unilateral directives. 
  Because presidents have a desire to build a policy record, they must work with Congress 
under the constitutional structure, even when facing a hostile Congress (Fine and Warber 2012). 
This fact demonstrates a key aspect of the relationship between the strategic model and 
Neustadt’s bargaining model, namely that they need not be mutually exclusive approaches to 
understanding presidential power (Deering and Maltzman 1999; Mayer and Price 2002; 
Waterman 2010). Even when presidents take unilateral action, there is room for negotiation with 
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Congress. In the strategic model, unilateral action simply takes the place of bargaining, coalition 
building, and other personality-based tools of persuasion (Waterman 2010). Unilateral action, 
particularly executive orders, allow the president to place himself in a power position for any 
negotiations by preempting Congressional action. This approach shifts the burden to Congress, 
or the courts, to overturn the executive order the president has issued. This has historically been a 
difficult task to accomplish because, for various reasons, Congress, or the Supreme Court, have 
lacked the power, or desire, to overturn the president’s executive orders (Deering and Maltzman 
1999; Howell 2003). 
 The difficulties that Congress has historically faced in attempting to overturn executive 
orders are multifaceted. One difficulty Congress faces is that the president will be more likely to 
act unilaterally when Congress is unable to pass legislation, thereby meaning that it is too weak 
to constrain the president (Howell 2003). Because presidents will weigh the costs and benefits of 
issuing a particular executive order before doing so, it is unlikely that an executive order will be 
issued unless Congress is too weak to overturn it (Deering and Maltzman 1999; Mayer and Price 
2002). Another difficulty identified in the literature is the “gridlock interval”, which is a policy 
space in which the ideological composition of Congress is unfavorable to passing legislation 
(Brady and Volden 2005). In this model, the president can use executive orders to either move an 
issue into or out of the gridlock interval based on their policy preferences (Brady and Volden 
2005). In other words, the president can take advantage of Congressional gridlock to either 
promote or hinder the passage of a particular policy.  
Presidents have a distinct strategic advantage over Congress in this type of struggle 
because, “legislators will evaluate the presidential shift in the status quo in terms of their 
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constituency-based policy preferences, not in terms of the institutional power struggle” (Moe and 
Howell 1999, 863). So, by acting first, the president puts Congress in a position wherein it’s 
overturning the executive order may be unfavorable for constituency reasons or unfeasible based 
on institutional reasons. The potential downside of this strategy is that if the president does not 
weigh the potential costs accurately, and chooses an issue with a strong constituency based 
feeling that coincides with the status quo, then it will be more likely that Congress may take 
action to overturn the executive order (Moe and Howell 1999). 
Congress also has to contend with the veto when considering whether to challenge an 
executive order (Howell 2003). The percentage of votes needed to overturn an executive order, 
two-thirds, to avoid the veto threat is typically unobtainable for Congress due to intrabranch 
conflict or partisan loyalty. Howell (2003) found that between 1945 and 1998, Congress made 
only forty-five formal attempts to directly challenge an executive order through passage of a bill. 
Warber (2006) finds that as the presidency has become more institutionalized, Congress has 
presented fewer challenges to executive orders. Under Truman, Congress modified 11.6 percent 
of all executive orders, whereas under George H.W. Bush it modified only 0.3 percent of all 
executive orders (Warber 2006, 119). The decline in challenges to executive orders could be an 
effect of the process of institutionalization of the presidency or a result of presidents being more 
strategic in their issuance of executive orders. Further, more nuanced, study of this aspect of 
executive orders is needed to address that particular question. 
The judiciary is another potential obstacle to the president’s use of unilateral power. In 
the unilateral power model, judges are considered, “along the same policy dimension 
as…Congress and the president” (Howell 2003, 136). Placing judges on the same policy 
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dimension in the strategic model is consistent with the idea that judges make decisions based on 
their own policy preferences (Howell 2003; Segal and Spaeth 1993). Studies have reported that 
the judiciary has been hesitant to overturn executive orders despite having the power to do so. 
For instance, the Supreme Court has the power to invoke judicial review of executive orders but 
do not do so with frequency (Warber 2006). This hesitancy to overturn executive orders could be 
a result of the Courts not having the means to monitor all administrative activity coming out of 
the White House or it could represent the fact that the judiciary is reliant on the president for 
enforcement of its rulings and acts strategically to maintain a favorable relationship with the 
executive branch (Howell 2003; Warber 2006). 
Some studies have found alternatives to divided government and the political 
environment to explain the conditions under which presidents will issue executive orders. Mayer 
(2001) finds that the president’s approval rating is an important component of the relationship 
between the president, Congress, and the judiciary. He argues that presidents having 
comparatively low approval ratings may use executive orders to circumvent, “institutional actors 
who might be emboldened in their opposition to what they perceive as a weak White House” 
(Mayer 2001, 90). This finding is in contrast to earlier studies, which found weak support for the 
idea that presidential popularity would impact the number of presidential executive orders 
(Krause and Cohen 1997). The share of seats that the president’s party holds in Congress is 
another alternative explanation that has had mixed results with some scholars refuting the 
importance of seat share (Deering and Maltzman 1999) and others finding support for the 
importance of seat shares (Marshall and Pacelle 2005). The importance of this concept is that 
seat share and ideological congruence may be more important factors than divided government 
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in explaining use of executive orders. Unfortunately, the mixed findings in the literature to date 
do not resolve the issue of whether the strategic model explains presidential use of executive 
orders. These mixed findings are the result of imprecision and inconsistency in how the concepts 
are substantively measured. 
 
The Two Presidencies 
 
The two presidencies thesis argues that presidents will generally have comparatively 
higher levels of congressional support for their foreign policy initiatives but will typically 
struggle to gain congressional support for their domestic policy initiatives (Wildavsky 1966; 
1998). The reason for this is that members of Congress are concerned with the wishes of their 
constituencies who are typically more focused on domestic issues. Foreign policy, on the other 
hand, is viewed as the president’s domain because he has informational advantages (Wildavsky 
1966; 1998). The two presidencies thesis has inspired a debate about whether there really are two 
presidencies or if the two presidencies thesis only holds under certain conditions.  
Sigelman (1979), in the first major challenge to the two presidencies thesis, argues that 
Wildavsky’s methodology, using box score votes, was flawed and that one must limit the 
analysis to key votes on major issues. Sigelman concludes that the two presidencies thesis does 
not exist empirically when one excludes routine roll call votes that are, in his estimation, 
meaningless for determining whether the president is granted greater latitude by Congress on 
foreign policy issues. Disagreements with Wildavsky’s methodology continued in several later 
studies.    
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In an examination of what they term conflictual roll call votes, Fleisher and Bond (1988) 
find that the two presidencies phenomenon exists only for Republican presidents. They argue 
that this is because Democrats are more likely to support Republican presidents on issues of 
foreign policy than vice versa. They also find that on the foreign policy votes they deemed as 
important, the evidence in support of the two presidencies thesis disappears entirely. It has also 
been argued that support for presidential policy initiatives, both foreign and domestic, has 
become increasingly partisan since the 1980’s, thereby erasing any two presidencies 
phenomenon that may have previously existed (Fleisher, Bond, et. al 2000). Other studies have 
extended, and found support for, this methodology and conclusions regarding the lack of 
evidence for the two presidencies thesis (Schraufnagel and Shellman 2001).  
Not all of the literature published after Wildavsky’s article disagrees with his findings 
regarding the two presidencies, however. Canes-Wrone, Howell, and Lewis (2008) argue that 
Congress has institutional incentives for allowing the president leeway in making foreign policy. 
They hypothesize that this freer hand on foreign policy is sometimes given to the president 
through inaction on the part of Congress, thereby making analysis of roll-call votes ineffective 
for detecting the presence of the two presidencies. To test this theory, they conduct an analysis in 
two areas, one that Congress can delegate (agency creation), and one it cannot (budgetary 
appropriations). They find evidence that the president does have more influence over foreign 
policy and, therefore, argue that the two presidencies thesis is valid. 
Overall, the inconsistency in the findings on the two presidencies thesis results from a 
lack of recognition of the complexity of the relationship between the president and Congress. It 
is possible that the existence of the two presidencies is issue-specific and therefore, much like 
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with executive orders, broad categorizations do not reveal the mechanisms at work. This study 
will be a valid test of the two presidencies thesis as it will be evaluated in a specific area with 




Mayer (2010) points out that unlike the normative approach to studying the presidency 
that was dominant in the bargaining theory literature, the unilateral power school has taken a 
more empirical approach to the study of the presidency. However, despite taking a more data-
driven approach than the bargaining theory based studies that came before it, the unilateral 
powers literature has failed to operate in a rigorous and theoretically consistent manner (Moe 
2009). The lack of empirical rigor in the field has led to mixed findings regarding the impact of 
multiple variables such as divided government, public approval and partisan difference between 
the president and Congress on the president’s decision to issue executive orders. The most 
significant reason for the mixed findings is the variety of ways in which executive orders have 
been defined and measured. In this section, I will examine the various methodological 
approaches that political scientists have taken.  
 One of the earliest works on the use of executive orders by the president was By Order of 
the President (Cooper 1986). In this article Cooper argues that through the use of unilateral 
power, presidents have greater power than is traditionally recognized but warns that this 
expanding power is a threat to constitutionally based administrative law. Cooper makes two 
primary arguments in his article. The first is that executive mandates have become so wide 
ranging in their usage that they must be viewed as “mechanisms of governance” (Cooper 1986, 
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234). The second is that extensive use of executive orders represents an attack on public 
administration by the president. Cooper (1986) views the use of executive orders as an attempt 
by presidents to circumvent the Constitution-based system of law. This second concern 
demonstrates the ties that Cooper’s work has to Neustadt’s view of the president as a clerk, and 
thusly, the early ties between the bargaining model and unilateral model of presidential behavior. 
Although Cooper is recognizing power beyond persuasion he is not comfortable with its use and 
argues for limitations on the president’s use of unilateral action. Cooper does not call for the 
abolition of executive orders, but rather that they be used carefully and only when needed.  
 Krause and Cohen (1997) examined the annual issuance of executive orders from 1953 to 
1994 to determine what factors lead a president to issue an order. Their theoretical approach was 
to account for both the legislative environment and the institutional composition of the 
presidency, while also factoring in what they termed “public prestige”. In constructing their 
dependent variable, they aggregated the number of annual executive orders but excluded those 
they deemed to be ceremonial or cultural in nature. Their statistical approach, which is common 
to many of these studies, is to model their estimation using negative binomial distribution and 
Poisson regression. They find that party seat margin in Congress is a significant predictor of the 
use of executive orders in that as the president’s party gains more seats in the House, he will 
issue more executive orders. They find the inverse to be true for the Senate. In terms of public 
prestige, they find that presidential popularity is not a significant predictor of unilateral action, 
but that a rise in the public’s dissatisfaction with the economy results in the issuance of more 
executive orders. Krause and Cohen argue that this finding demonstrates that the institutional 
approach is not completely accurate and that there are other factors to consider. What their model 
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does not take into account, however, is the president’s ability to calculate potential political gains 
and loses as a result of his actions. 
 Deering and Maltzman’s (1999) strategic model is designed to account for the president’s 
anticipating the consequences of his actions when deciding whether to issue an executive order. 
Unlike other studies (Krause and Cohen 1997; Mayer 1999) that argue against the strategic 
model, Deering and Maltzman argue that the president does take advantage of having executive 
orders at his disposal when facing a hostile Congress. An important caveat to their finding is that 
presidents only issue executive orders in this manner when they are fairly certain Congress will 
not overturn them via legislation. The dependent variable in their model is the total number of 
executive orders issued annually from 1946 to 1994.  
To determine when a president is most likely to face having an order overturned, Deering 
and Maltzman (1999) use a veto pivot model to calculate the ideological distance between the 
president and the veto pivots in each chamber of Congress. The second aspect of their 
ideological model is the relationship between the president and legislative leaders. To calculate 
the ideological distance between the president and the median members in Congress, they use the 
absolute value of the difference of each parties W NOMINATE score. Using this method, they 
conclude that divided government does not predict an increase in the use of executive orders but 
the ideological distances described above do. In sum, their argument is that presidents 
strategically issue orders to circumvent Congress, but the president’s decision to issue an 
executive order, “depends upon both his positive power to get legislation enacted by Congress 
and his negative power to stop legislation overturning such an executive order” (Deering and 
Maltzman 1999). 
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Mayer (1999; 2001) argues that Neustadt’s behavioral approach to the study of the 
presidency has gone too far in depicting the executive branch as weak. In Mayer’s estimation, 
prior research “has mistakenly concluded that executive power generally and executive orders in 
particular are not important to presidents” (Mayer 2001, 22). Mayer contends that the previous 
literature on the subject lacks an accurate perspective on executive orders. Mayer characterizes 
executive orders “as an indicator of executive flexibility and initiative in policymaking” (Mayer 
1999, 450). Starting with this viewpoint, Mayer attempts to account for variation in how 
presidents take advantage of the activist nature of the executive office. Mayer argues that 
ultimately Democratic presidents, because they believe in a larger role for government, will issue 
more executive orders. 
Mayer analyzes a sample (N=1,028) of executive orders issued from 1936 to 1999 
(approximately 5,800 orders were issued in that time period). He disaggregates them into 
categories of executive branch administration, civil service, public lands, defense and military 
policy, foreign affairs, war and emergency powers, labor policy, and domestic policy. Mayer 
then isolates significant orders by considering whether they were subject to attention by the 
press, attention from other political actors/institutions such as congressional hearings, whether 
scholars referred to the order as important, whether presidents themselves deemed it important, 
whether the order created an institution with policy implications, and whether the order resulted 
in litigation. The weakness of this approach is that Mayer is relying on a representative sample of 
orders and then dividing them into a large number of categories. This approach lacks the 
parsimony of a simple division such as foreign policy and domestic policy executive orders or 
major and symbolic executive orders.  
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Mayer (1999; 2001) finds that divided government does not have the expected impact on 
the number of executive orders issued by the president. For a majority of time, the impact of 
divided government was no different than measuring the difference between Republican and 
Democratic presidents due to the fact that the Democrats controlled Congress for much of the 
time period that these studies covered. For those presidents who faced both unified and divided 
government during their terms (Truman, Eisenhower, and Clinton), the results show no effect for 
Truman and an increased number of executive orders for Eisenhower and Clinton during times of 
unified government.  
What Mayer (1999; 2001) does find is that the overall political environment (approval 
ratings, campaigning, where in the term the president is), not divided government, is predictive 
of the number of orders that a president will issue. He also finds that at the end of a term, or 
during periods of reelection, there is an uptick in the number of orders issued. Low approval 
ratings also predict increased use of executive orders. He argues that these findings suggest that 
the president can use executive orders to set an agenda and move Congress and the courts in his 
preferred policy direction. Presidents, in Mayer’s estimation, are, “less dependent on personality 
or powers of persuasion than on the office’s formal authority” (Mayer 2001, 224) when it comes 
to affecting policy.  
Mayer and Price (2001) use a similar approach to Mayer (1999; 2001); however, they 
exclude indicators for each president because their interest is in reviewing the “larger contours of 
the institution” (Mayer and Price 2001, 378) more so than individual presidential action. Their 
results essentially mirror Mayer’s results with the exception of finding no evidence of party 
difference in the issuance of executive orders. 
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Marshall and Pacelle (2005) examine the use of executive orders by the president to test 
whether the two presidencies thesis remains a useful concept for understanding presidential 
behavior. Their analysis covers the time period of 1953 to 1997. Marshall and Pacelle examine 
the use of executive orders in both domestic and foreign policy areas to test their hypothesis that 
the two presidencies thesis is still valid, but only for understanding specific presidential 
behaviors. They include a variable measuring the presence of divided government, however their 
primary independent variable for testing the two presidencies thesis was the percentage of House 
and Senate seats that the president’s party held. They estimated two models; one with all of their 
independent variables included and one with the House and Senate seat variable excluded. In the 
model with all independent variables included, divided government was shown not to be 
significantly predictive of the issuance of either foreign or domestic policy centered executive 
orders. However, when they estimated the model excluding the House and Senate seat variable, 
divided government showed signs of significance in the foreign policy arena. This finding 
warrants further exploration of the impact of divided government on the issuance of executive 
orders across foreign and domestic policy. 
The literature on the unilateral presidency has resulted in mixed findings due to 
incomplete measuring of both the types of executive orders issued and ideological gaps between 
the president and Congress (Fine and Warber 2012). Fine and Warber (2012) attempt to 
reconcile the differences between those studies that find that presidents issue more orders to 
bypass an ideological gap with Congress (Deering and Maltzman 1999) and those studies that 
find that the issuance of executive orders increases with unified government (Howell 2003; 
Krause and Cohen 1997; Mayer 1999; 2001). In Fine and Warber’s estimation, divided 
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government should theoretically matter due to its being, “harder for presidents to assemble a 
sufficient number of votes to achieve policy success…and the policy preferences of presidents 
and legislators are more likely to diverge” (Fine and Warber 2012; 259). 
Fine and Warber (2012) construct their executive order dependent variable by content 
analyzing every available executive order from 1953 to 2008 and classifying it as either routine, 
symbolic or major. They define major executive orders as those, “either departing from the status 
quo of a specific policy that has already been implemented, or interpreting and implementing 
legislation that diverts from the original intent of Congress” (Warber 2006, 143)1. Like Mayer 
(1999; 2001), Fine and Warber use monthly data. To measure the ideological separation between 
the president and Congress, they use the Common Space DW-NOMINATE scores to calculate 
the absolute distance between the median member of the Senate and the president. The median 
House member score is not included in the model due to issues of multicollinearity. They chose 
the Senate based on Deering and Maltzman (1999) demonstrating that the Senate and president 
distance matters more to the prediction of the presidents use of executive orders than the House 
distance (Fine and Warber 2012). 
The results of Fine and Warber’s study demonstrate that divided government alone is not 
enough to predict an increase in the use of major executive orders. However, as the ideological 
distance between the president and Congress increases, there is a significant increase in the use 
                                                 
1 This definition is taken from Warber’s (2006) earlier book and applied to the updated research design of Warber 
and Fine (2012). 
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of executive orders. They also find that presidential approval has a significant inverse impact on 
the use of executive orders.  
One conclusion that can be drawn from the totality of these studies is that divided 
government alone is not enough to explain a shift to prerogative politics by the executive branch. 
The factors that have led to the unilateral presidency are much more nuanced than that. Although 
there have been many important, and consistent, findings across these studies, there remains 
much room for debate. Are presidents strategic actors who take advantage of times of 
congressional gridlock to implement policy through the use of executive orders? Or do 
presidents take advantage of favorable times, such as unified government, when there is little risk 
of challenge to their executive orders?  
These questions remain largely unanswered due to the lack of consistent measurement of 
key concepts in the prior studies. As this review has demonstrated, even when scholars agree on 
dividing executive orders into groups demarcating those that are significant from those that are 
not they have not taken a consistent approach. Some have used content analysis, while others 
have relied on media coverage or congressional attention. The content analysis approach allows 
for a more direct evaluation of the content and purpose of the orders, but is subject to the coder’s 
subjective opinions. The media analysis approach allows for a more objective outside opinion, 
but does not allow for the nuance that a researcher can glean from direct analysis of the text of 
the orders. Addressing some of these inconsistencies is what informs the current research 
question of this present study.  
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CHAPTER THREE: METHODOLOGY 
 This chapter will detail the four hypotheses that have been developed based on the 
theoretical findings discussed in the literature review. After setting forth the hypotheses this 
chapter will provide a detailed description of the methodology that will be used to test the four 
hypotheses. Hypotheses 1 and 3 are designed to determine whether the methodological updates 
this study undertakes result in similar findings to prior studies. Hypotheses 2 and 4 then extend 
the specification and estimation of the models to the original foreign policy-based and domestic 




Following the foundational logic of the unilateral power model, the primary theoretical 
proposition of this study is that when faced with strong legislative opposition, presidents will 
resort to unilateral actions, such as issuing executive orders, to achieve their policy goals. As the 
review of prior literature on this topic reveals, studies operating under the same premise have 
reported mixed findings. The inconsistencies in these findings create an empirical challenge to 
the basic presumptions of the unilateral power model. Namely, there is a questions as to whether 
the theory is flawed or that the specifications of prior models have failed to adequately model 
presidential behavior in relation to the use of unilateral power. This study argues that the 
unilateral power model is empirically valid and that the mixed findings have been a result of 
measurement issues.  
Although divided government alone has generally been shown not to be predictive of an 
increase in the issuance of executive orders, there have been findings to support the idea that, to 
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some degree, divided government matters to this issue. The literature on this topic has made 
attempts to define the parameters in which the president will take unilateral action and what role 
divided government has in defining those parameters. The lack of scholarly consensus regarding 
the extent of the effect of divided government on unilateral action leaves open the question of 
under which circumstances divided government impacts the issuance of executive orders. The 
goal of this study is to contribute to the current literature by further defining the constraints and 
obstacles that lead presidents to take unilateral action by evaluating their use of executive orders 
in foreign and domestic policy under both unified and divided government. 
The president’s relationship with Congress has historically differed on issues of domestic 
and foreign policy. Presidents are typically able to garner comparatively more congressional 
support for their foreign policy initiatives while they struggle to gain congressional support for 
their domestic policies, regardless of whether they are operating under unified or divided 
government (Wildavsky 1966; 1998). This is an important concept to keep in mind when 
analyzing presidential use of unilateral actions. Because unilateral power theory posits that 
presidents will use executive orders to circumvent roadblocks in Congress, it is necessary to 
examine executive orders in the context of domestic and foreign policy; in that if presidents face 
less resistance from Congress in relation to their foreign policy initiatives, under both unified and 
divided government, then measuring executive orders monolithically may skew the findings as 
they relate to the impact divided government. Conversely, subdividing executive orders into 
overly-specific topical categories lacks parsimony and, ultimately, the ability to define the 
theoretical circumstances under which the president will resort to unilateral action. Maintaining 
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categories, such as foreign and domestic policy, that are specific but broad allows for evaluating 
the “larger contours” of presidential action that Mayer and Price argue in favor of (2001).  
By isolating foreign and domestic policy orders as separate variables, it is possible to test 
whether presidents issue more executive orders under divided government, in a policy area 
(domestic policy) that is more likely to be contentious, than in a policy area where they typically 
meet less resistance from Congress (foreign policy). If it holds true that more domestic policy 
orders are issued under divided government than unified government, it would lend credence to 
the basic assumptions of the unilateral powers model. If the findings are as expected, they would 
also demonstrate that the two presidencies thesis is to some extent empirically supported, at least 
in this area of presidential action. Such a finding regarding presidential issuance of executive 
orders would accord with recent scholarship on the two presidencies thesis, which argues that the 
two presidencies thesis cannot be detected across all domains of presidential behavior but rather, 
applies to specific areas of presidential action (Canes-Wrone, Howell, and Lewis 2008).   
However, simply dividing the executive orders by foreign and domestic policy is not 
sufficient, alone, for testing the assumptions of the unilateral powers model. To more effectively 
gauge the impact of divided government on the use of executive orders, they must be divided 
based on their substantive merits. Prior studies have accomplished this by categorizing them as 
major, routine, and symbolic executive orders (Fine and Warber 2012; Mayer 1999; 2001). That 
methodology will be followed in the current study, because doing so indicates, if a president is 
acting strategically, there are likely different circumstances under which they will issue different 
types of executive orders. For instance, presidents that are operating under divided government 
may issue a larger number of major policy orders; whereas, those facing unified government may 
 31 
issue more routine and symbolic orders. When facing divided government, it is unlikely that 
presidents would want to risk provoking Congress by issuing a large number of relatively 
unimportant executive orders. Rather, the president would likely want to reserve the use of 
executive orders for pushing through major policy initiatives or reframing the debate over a 
major policy issue (Fine and Warber 2012; Mayer 1999; 2001). Under unified government, the 
issuance of executive orders, regardless of type, should not be a significant concern for the 
president. 
This study hypothesizes that the president will issue more major domestic policy centered 
executive orders under divided government. By categorizing all executive orders as a single 
entity, or disaggregating them into overly specific categories, prior studies have not detected the 
difference between the president’s use of foreign and domestic policy-based executive orders. 
This shortcoming has led, in part, to the mixed results noted above. The first two hypotheses in 
this study are related to this concept. 
H1: Presidents will be more likely to issue major executive orders during periods  
       of divided government than routine and symbolic orders. 
 
H2: Presidents will be more likely to issue major domestic policy-based executive  
       orders during times of divided government than foreign policy-based  
       executive orders.  
 
Presidential and congressional preferences are also an important dynamic that needs 
further study. Although the strictest form of the unilateral powers model does not account for 
factors such as presidential psychology and personal preferences I adopt here the less strict 
approach that many of the studies in this field have taken. Presidential policy preferences, and 
the political environment, are important factors in understanding how and when the president 
will engage in unilateral action (Deering and Maltzman 1999; Fine and Warber 2012; Mayer 
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2010; Moe and Howell 1999; Waterman 2010). Taking a rational choice approach to the 
unilateral powers model allows for a more detailed analysis of presidential unilateral action than 
simply analyzing divided, or mixed, government. In this approach, the ideological position of the 
president, in relation to the Congressional veto pivots and median chamber members, is likely to 
impact his decision making process when determining whether to act unilaterally. This approach 
to the question of when presidents will act unilaterally informs the second set of hypotheses.  
H3: The wider the ideological gap is between the president and median chamber   
       members, the more likely the president is to issue major executive orders. 
 
H4: The wider the ideological gap is between the president and median chamber  
       members, the more likely the president is to issue domestic executive orders. 
Consistent with the unilateral powers theory, I expect to find that presidents will issue 
major executive orders in a strategic manner in order to overcome legislative obstructions 
resulting from divided government and ideological gaps. By testing for different presidential 
approaches to the issuance of domestic and foreign policy centered executive orders, this study 
will add to the literature that has already examined the difference between major, routine, and 
symbolic executive orders. Because unilateral power theory posits that unilateral action is taken 
to circumvent institutional barriers, namely Congress, it is reasonable to suspect that presidents 
will use their unilateral tools more often in the domestic policy sphere, which tends to be more 
antagonistic, than the foreign policy sphere where they traditionally meet less congressional 
resistance. 
 
Variables and Methodology 
 
Construction of the dependent variables for this study was informed by prior studies 
before adding a new factor, domestic and foreign policy, to the specification. Many of the prior 
 33 
studies on this topic employ a dependent variable that consists of the number of either the 
monthly or yearly executive orders issued by the president (Deering and Maltzman 1999; Fine 
and Warber 2012; Mayer 1999, 2001; Mayer and Price 2002; Warber 2006). Utilizing a dataset 
compiled by Warber (2006; Fine and Warber 2012) this study subdivides the executive orders 
into two categories; the first category is all major executive orders issued on a yearly basis; the 
second category combines all routine and symbolic executive orders into a single annual count. 
Other studies have similarly divided executive orders, but did so using only a sample of orders 
(Mayer 1999, 2001; Mayer and Price 2002). Although the sampling methods used in the 
aforementioned studies are quite sophisticated, this study follows Warber’s (2006; Fine and 
Warber 2012) method of content analyzing all executive orders the president issued between 
1953 and 2008. Content analyzing all of the executive orders in the chosen timeframe increases 
the findings validity because there is less chance of sampling error. 
There are several methodological reasons for subdividing the dependent variable into 
significant and routine/symbolic orders. First, doing so allows for a clearer depiction of the rise 
of unilateral activity by the president that is more accurate than if the orders were categorized as 
a single unit. During the earlier years covered by this study, there were many aspects of routine 
government activity (that are now handled by governmental agencies) that were conducted by 
executive order. Therefore the total number of executive orders issued by the president is skewed 
upward in the earlier parts of the twentieth century (Howell 2003). If one were to graph the total 
number of executive orders it would reflect a precipitous drop in the number of executive orders 
as time goes on. However, Howell (2003) has shown that the number of significant executive 
orders issued by the president has increased over the same time period that the total number of 
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executive orders has decreased. Second, because this study argues that presidents make choices 
regarding what type of executive orders to issue based on the extent of resistance they may face 
from Congress, it is necessary to divide the orders into specific categories that provide a clearer 
test of the strategic model. In other words, symbolic and routine executive orders may be 
impacting the results when major policy based orders are what truly matter to the theory (Fine 
and Warber 2012). 
The dependent variable in this study is further disaggregated based on whether the 
executive order in question pertained to foreign policy or domestic policy. To accomplish this, 
all executive orders issued between 1953 and 2008 were content analyzed to determine if they 
should be coded as related to foreign or domestic policy. The text of the executive orders is 
available online through The American Presidency Project (Peters 2015). In the case of any 
potential overlap, such as with issues of immigration which can impact both foreign and 
domestic policy, it was decided which policy area that the order most impacted and coded as 
belonging to that category. This approach resulted in six categories for the domestic/foreign 
policy dependent variables: domestic policy, domestic major, domestic minor, foreign, foreign 
major, and foreign minor executive orders. The domestic minor and foreign minor categories 
consist of the combined symbolic and routine orders.    
To test hypotheses one and two the first independent variable is coded to capture the 
presence of divided, unified, or mixed government. The variable is coded as unified government 
when the president’s party controls both chambers of Congress. For the purposes of this study, 
divided government means only those situations in which the party that is different from the 
president’s party controlled both chambers of Congress. When two different parties control each 
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chamber of Congress, the variable is coded as mixed government. A simple dummy variable for 
divided and unified government was not used because it has been shown that the president’s 
strategy changes depending on whether he is facing pure divided or mixed divided government 
(Binder 2003; Godwin and Ilderton 2014). 
In relation to hypothesis one the theoretical expectation for the divided government 
variable is that the coefficient for divided government will have the strongest explanatory power 
when presidents issue major executive orders. The divided government coefficient is expected to 
be positive. Consistent with the theory, mixed and unified government should have relatively 
less influence, if any, over the issuance of executive orders by the president. For hypotheses two, 
the expectations are essentially the same with the difference being that the greater impact should 
be seen in the issuance of major domestic policy executive orders rather than major foreign 
policy executive orders because there is an expectation that the president has comparatively 
greater support in the foreign policy arena so he would not need to resort to unilateral action. 
 Because hypotheses three and four posit that the ideological gap between the president 
and the median chamber members is an important explanatory factor in understanding 
presidential use of executive orders, an independent variable consisting of Bailey’s ideal point 
estimates (Bailey 2007; 2011) is used. This variable was calculated by using the Bailey score to 
determine the absolute value of the distance between the president and the median chamber 
members. Bailey’s ideal point estimates are designed to be comparable across both time and 
institution making them appropriate for this type of study (Bailey 2007; 2011). The temporal and 
spatial comparability of the Bailey scores make them preferable to other preference 
measurements, such as NOMINATE scores (Carroll et al. 2013) or ADA scores (Groseclose, 
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Levitt, and Snyder 1999), which suffer from a lack of comparability across either time or 
institution (Bailey 2007; 2011). The other measurement scores are useful for certain types of 
research questions however; for this study, which is concerned with the impact of institutional 
relations, over time, on presidential executive action, the Bailey measurement is most 
appropriate. 
 The primary expectation for the model testing hypothesis three is that the coefficient for 
the ideological distance variable will be positive and significant in relation to the issuance of 
executive orders, meaning that as the ideological gap between the president and the median 
chamber member increases, the use of major executive orders will increase. This expectation 
arises from the theoretical assumption that the president will use major executive orders to 
circumvent, or spur action by, a hostile Congress. It is expected that this coefficient will not be 
statistically significant in relation to the issuance of routine/symbolic orders. 
 The expectations for hypothesis four are as follows; the coefficient for the distance 
variable will be positive and statistically significant in relation to the issuance of major domestic 
policy-based executive orders. The coefficients in relation to foreign policy-based domestic 
orders are not expected to be statistically significant. This prediction is based on the idea that the 
president is usually able to garner comparatively higher levels of support for his foreign policy 
agenda regardless of the presence of unified, divided, or mixed government. Because Congress 
tends to support the president on foreign policy, he need not use executive orders of this type to 
circumvent Congress. However, because domestic policy is a more contentious arena, 
particularly under divided government, it is expected that the president will have to resort to the 
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use of executive orders when facing a Congress that is not ideologically aligned with his policy 
preferences. 
       A variety of control variables based on prior studies and findings will be included in 
the models as well. The first control variable is presidential approval rating. The approval ratings 
were obtained from The American Presidency Project website, which contains all Gallup poll 
approval ratings for the time period covered by this study. Because this study uses a yearly event 
count variable as the dependent variable, the approval rating variable was calculated by taking 
the average approval rating for the year. This approach lacks the specificity that being able to use 
monthly data would provide; however, because of the nature of the dependent variable, this 
methodology was necessary.  
 Presidential approval ratings have been included as a variable because prior research has 
shown that they impact the president’s decision to issue an executive order. Unfortunately, the 
results have been mixed. Some researchers have found that the use of executive orders increases 
as approval ratings also increase (Krause and Cohen 1997); whereas, others have found the 
inverse to be true (Deering and Maltzman 1999; Mayer 1999; 2001; Mayer and Price 2002). 
Despite these inconclusive findings, it is clear that there is a relationship between approval 
ratings and presidential use of executive orders. It may be that presidents will strategically take 
advantage of an increase in popularity to take unilateral action because they believe that 
Congress will be less likely to challenge the actions of a popular president. Conversely, 
presidents with declining approval ratings may be tempted to use unilateral action on issues 
salient to the general public to demonstrate that they are serious about “getting things done”. 
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 A dummy variable measuring the president’s party has been included as well. This 
variable is coded “0” for all Republican presidents and “1” for all Democrats. This control 
variable has been included because prior studies have demonstrated that the president’s party 
influences the number of executive orders the president issues. There are varying theories as to 
why but they all arrive at the same conclusion; that Democratic presidents issue more executive 
orders than Republican presidents. One explanation has been that Democrats, in general, prefer 
larger government than Republicans and, therefore, use more executive orders (Deering and 
Maltzman 1999; Mayer 2001; Warber 2006). Mayer (2001) also argues that testing for the 
impact of divided government on the use of executive orders and testing for the effects of the 
president’s party affiliation are essentially the same thing. He found the results to be 
indistinguishable from one another. Fine and Warber (2012) argue that Democratic presidents 
have a more diverse base of support and, therefore, may use more executive orders than 
Republican presidents simply to acknowledge the concerns of different constituencies.  
 A control variable has been included for major events, such as the September 11, 2001 
attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, to account for periods of time when 
presidents may be more likely to issue executive orders regardless of their relationship with 
Congress. The variable is coded “0” for years in which no major event, as defined in this study, 
has taken place and is coded “1” for those years in which one has taken place. The years that are 
coded “1” are as follows: 1953 (Korean War), 1964-1973 (Vietnam Conflict), 1991-1992 
(Persian Gulf War), 2001-2009 (9/11, Iraq War, and Afghanistan War). This list is not inclusive 
of all major events that took place during the years this study covers, but rather those that were 
likely to be associated with an increase in the use of executive orders. 
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     Individual models were estimated for each of the dependent variables designed to test 
the strategic model within the context of the two presidencies thesis. The dependent variables are 
all count variables, so negative binomial regression was used to estimate them (Cameron and 
Trividi 1998). Negative binomial regression is a more appropriate test of count data than 
Ordinary Least Squares regression or Poisson regression when over-dispersion is present in the 
data because it accounts for the fact that the conditional variance of the dependent variable is 
greater than the conditional mean (Cameron and Trivedi 1998; Jackman, Kleiber, and Zeileis 
2008). Over-dispersion in the count data in this study was confirmed using the dispersiontest 
command in the AER (Zeileis 2008) package in R and the odTest command from the PSCL 
(Jackman 2008) package in R. Both tests confirmed that alpha was greater than zero, with p-
values of zero; therefore, negative binomial regression was a more appropriate test than using a 
Poisson regression for all models.   
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CHAPTER FOUR: DATA ANALYSIS 
 This chapter begins with an evaluation of the descriptive statistics related to the 
hypotheses and theoretical expectations outlined in the previous chapters. After a short review of 
the descriptive statistics, the chapter moves on to describe the results of the negative binomial 
regressions that were estimated. Finally, the chapter will discuss the implications of these 




 Between 1953 and 2008, presidents issued a total of 3,055 executive orders. As seen in 
Table 1 (Appendix) there is variance in the total number of orders that each president issued 
varies dramatically. The numbers demonstrate a disparity in the total number of orders issued 
that appears to be influenced by factors other than total number of years in office. For instance, 
in a comparison of the presidents who served two terms G.W. Bush issued 286 total orders and 
Dwight D. Eisenhower issued 484 total orders. Bill Clinton and Ronald Reagan both issued a 
number of orders between Eisenhower and G.W. Bush with 364 and 381 total orders, 
respectively.  
 The significant decline in the total number of orders issued is partly indicative of the era 
during which each president served. Figure 1 demonstrates that there has been an overall decline 
in the total number of executive orders issued since 1953. However, as seen by comparing 
Figures 2 and 3, the decline in total orders can largely be attributed to a significant decrease in 
the number of symbolic and routine orders. The explanation for why symbolic and routine orders 
have declined so precipitously is fairly straightforward; as the bureaucratization of the executive 
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branch has increased, and executive orders have been used to delegate authority, there has been a 
corresponding decrease in the need for the president to handle routine administrative tasks via 
executive order (Deering and Maltzman 1999).  
 The number of major executive orders issued on an annual basis has not undergone as 
dramatic a change as the number of symbolic and routine orders; however the total number has 
clearly trended upwards over the 55 years covered by this study. That is the factor that leads to 
one of the central questions addressed in this study: specifically, why presidents are issuing more 
major executive orders while the total number of issued orders has declined.  
Table 2 addresses the second central question, namely, whether there is evidence to 
support the two presidencies in how presidents have issued executive orders. Based on the total 
number of orders issued in each policy area (1,019 in foreign policy and 2,036 in domestic 
policy) this question warrants further exploration. This study seeks to determine if presidents are 
issuing fewer foreign policy orders because they have greater success in Congress when it comes 
to foreign policy or if there are other factors that would explain the disparity in the total number 
of orders issued. 
 
Negative Binomial Regressions 
 
 Table 3 and Table 4 report the results of the models estimated to test hypotheses one and 
two. Column one in Table 3 shows the impact of the independent variables on the president’s 
issuance of executive orders in general. Unlike prior studies, this study accounts for pure divided 
government by including a variable for mixed government. In relation to the issuance of all 
executive orders, divided government is the only statistically significant indicator of the 
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president’s behavior. Under divided government, for each one standard deviation increase in the 
variable, presidents issue 21% fewer executive orders. The remainder of the columns in Table 3 
report the results regarding specific categories of executive orders to determine if the president’s 
decision to issue an executive order is affected by the type of order.   
 In column two, a model of the president’s issuance of major executive orders by the 
president is specified. The findings regarding divided government are consistent with those of 
Fine and Warber (2012) in that there is no apparent impact. However, by taking the analysis one 
step further and including mixed government, the findings show that presidents are 48% more 
likely to issue major executive orders when their party controls one of the chambers of Congress. 
This finding suggests that the impact of the relationship between the president and Congress on 
the issuance of executive orders is much more nuanced than simple conceptualizations, such as 
divided and unified government, can explain. This finding is important because it supports that 
notion that ideology is an important factor to consider.   
 Column two also demonstrates that the president’s party and approval ratings impact on 
the president’s issuance of major executive orders. This is consistent with prior findings 
regarding these two variables (Deering and Maltzman 1999; Fine and Warber 2012; Mayer 1999, 
2001). In this model, Democratic presidents are shown to be 57% more likely to issue major 
executive orders than Republican presidents while controlling for divided government. The 
coefficient for approval ratings is statistically significant and negative indicating that as the 
president’s approval ratings increase there is less likelihood of his issuing an executive order. 
This particular finding could indicate that popular presidents are able to achieve more 
legislatively and, therefore, do not have to resort to unilateral action. 
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 The estimated impact of the independent variables on the president’s issuance of 
symbolic and routine executive orders is reported in column three. Unlike major executive 
orders, both divided and mixed government have a statistically significant negative impact. In 
times of pure divided government, presidents are 41% less likely to issue symbolic and routine 
executive orders. Under mixed government they are 63% less likely to issue symbolic and 
routine executive orders. The results indicate that, unlike with major executive orders, it is 
Republican presidents who are more likely to issue symbolic and routine orders. The coefficient 
for approval ratings is significant at the .06 level, so any conclusions drawn from that coefficient 
are tenuous; but may indicate that popular presidents issue more symbolic and routine executive 
orders.  
 Overall, the results reported in Table 3 demonstrate that use of the different types of 
executive orders is impacted by various factors; therefore, it is important to identify how 
presidential decision making differs, and is influenced, across executive order type. The division 
of executive orders into the major and symbolic and routine categories is an initial step to 
understanding this behavior. However, because there is reason to suspect that there are two 
presidencies (one for foreign policy and one for domestic policy) it is necessary to delineate 
foreign and domestic policy-based orders. Following the methodology of the first three models, 
the independent variables are first tested against the issuance of foreign and domestic policy-
based executive orders. The independent variables are then tested against major executive orders 
in each policy area and minor (consisting again of symbolic and routine orders) executive orders 
in each policy area. These results are reported in Table 4.  
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 For foreign policy executive orders, the only variables that reached conventional levels of 
statistical significance are those for divided government and major events. Both variable’s 
coefficients are negatively signed, indicating that the president issues fewer foreign policy-based 
executive orders when facing pure divided government or when a major event has recently 
occurred.  The finding that presidents issue 24% fewer foreign policy-based executive orders 
after a major event has occurred is an interesting finding. This may be indicative of bi-partisan 
unity during times of crisis, diminishing the need for executive orders. This is the same principle 
behind Brody’s (1991) conception that in times of crisis opinion leadership, such as that in 
Congress, “will be unusually full of bipartisan support for the president’s actions” (Brody 1991, 
66). However, this is the only model in Table 3, or Table 4, in which the major event variable’s 
coefficient estimate is statistically significant, so any conclusions drawn from this finding require 
further exploration to determine their theoretical value. 
 The findings in columns two and three of Table 4 have interesting implications for the 
findings in column one. They also further support the idea that it is important to evaluate specific 
aspects of presidential behavior in relation to the issuance of executive orders. The results 
indicate that the decline in foreign policy-based executive orders during times of pure divided 
government is explained by a decrease in the president’s issuance of routine and symbolic 
foreign policy orders. Under pure divided government these minor foreign policy orders decrease 
by 48%; whereas the relative number of major foreign policy orders is unaffected. The decrease 
in the issuance of minor foreign policy orders extends to times of mixed government when 
presidents are 59% less likely to issue them. These findings support the notion that presidents use 
executive orders strategically. The fact that major foreign policy orders do not decrease under 
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divided or mixed government, but minor foreign policy orders do, could be a result of presidents 
not wanting to alienate the opposing party in Congress by issuing a large number of relatively 
meaningless executive orders. Presidents may be attempting to mitigate the perception that they 
are abusing their unilateral powers by saving the use of foreign policy-based executive orders for 
major issues when they confront divided or mixed government.  
 The only other coefficient estimates that achieved statistical significance in columns two 
and three also support that perception is an important factor. Democratic presidents are 41% less 
likely to issue minor foreign policy executive orders than their Republican counterparts. This 
could be a result of the idea that foreign policy is a Republican arena, so Republican presidents 
feel more comfortable issuing executive orders of all types in relation to foreign policy. The 
other perception-centered variable that is statistically significant, in relation to major foreign 
policy orders, is the president’s approval rating. Consistent with the findings of Deering and 
Maltzman (1999), Fine and Warber (2012), and Mayer (1999, 2001), this variable indicates that 
an increase in presidential popularity coincides with the president’s issuance of fewer executive 
orders. The prior studies were concerned strictly with major orders, but this study demonstrates 
that the trend extends to major foreign policy-based orders as well. Once again, it appears that 
popular presidents are able to achieve more through the traditional legislative process and do not 
have to resort to the strategic use of unilateral action.  
 The model’s estimates reported in columns four, five, and six of Table 4 test the 
president’s use of domestic policy-based executive orders in relation to divided and mixed 
government. Interestingly, none of the variables reach statistical significance for domestic 
policy-based executive orders. However, when subdividing those orders into major and minor 
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orders, it becomes clear why; the issuance of major and minor domestic policy executive orders 
varies significantly in opposite directions. Under mixed government, the president is 54% more 
likely to issue a major domestic policy executive order; whereas minor domestic policy 
executive orders decrease by 65%. The coefficient estimates under divided government are also 
in the opposite direction of each other; however, the coefficient for major domestic policy orders 
is not statistically significant. The model does show that under divided government presidents 
issue fewer minor domestic policy-based executive orders. As in all other categories it appears 
that when facing divided, or mixed, government the president will temper the use of symbolic 
and routine executive orders. Again, this could demonstrate a willingness to show restraint in the 
use of unilateral action so that it can be deployed as a strategic tool on issues of greater 
importance to the president’s legislative goals.  
 A few other coefficients of interest in the model are the Democratic president variable 
and the approval rating variable. Democratic presidents are shown to be more likely to issue 
major domestic policy-based orders than Republican presidents, but less likely to issue minor 
domestic policy-based orders. The model and estimates also demonstrate that as presidential 
popularity increases, presidents issue fewer major domestic policy-based orders and more minor 
domestic policy-based orders2.  
   Hypothesis one posited that presidents would be more likely to issue major executive 
orders under divided government than routine and symbolic orders. The findings in relation to 
                                                 
2 Although the coefficient for minor orders is only significant at the .10 level the actual p value is .058; therefore, 
interpret this coefficient as having some meaning in the overall context of the study. 
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this hypothesis are mixed, but support the need to disaggregate executive orders into specific 
categories for comparison. Across all types of executive orders in this study there was a 
statistically significant decrease in the number of symbolic and executive orders under both 
divided and mixed government. The coefficient estimates for major executive orders, of all 
types, did not achieve conventional levels of statistical significance under divided government. 
So, under pure divided government, presidents clearly limit their use of unilateral action by 
decreasing the number of minor executive orders they issue. However, in terms of major orders 
there appears to be no impact on their behavior either way. Under mixed government, the 
president’s behavior is slightly different in that there is a definite statistically significant increase 
in the use of major executive orders. These mixed findings suggest that perhaps ideology, rather 
than simple divisions such as unified and divided government, is key to understanding when 
presidents will take unilateral action. This will be addressed in the review of the results from 
Table 5 and Table 6.  
 The findings related to hypothesis two are also mixed and supportive of the need for 
more nuanced analysis. The results demonstrate a significant decrease in the use of foreign 
policy-based executive orders under divided government; however, this decrease appears to be 
largely explained by the decrease in the use of minor foreign policy orders. The coefficient 
estimate for major foreign policy orders was not statistically significant. Divided government 
appears to have no impact on domestic policy orders other than a decrease in minor orders of that 
type. Under mixed government, there is an increase in the use of major domestic policy orders, 
but no discernible impact on the use of major foreign policy orders. Overall, the results do not 
definitively support or reject hypothesis one or two but rather demonstrate that further evaluation 
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is needed to understand the conditions under which a president will resort to the use of unilateral 
action. 
  Table 5 and Table 6 report the results of the models estimate to test the impact of 
ideology on the president’s use of unilateral action. This was accomplished by including a 
variable to capture the absolute value of the ideological distance between the president and 
median Senate member. The Senate was chosen because prior studies have established that 
inclusion of both the median House and Senate members resulted in issues of multicollinearity 
(Deering and Maltzman 1999; Fine and Warber 2012). Of the two chambers of Congress, the 
distance between the median Senate member and the president has been shown to be of more 
significance than the distance between the president and the median House member (Deering and 
Maltzman 1999); therefore, the Senate member variable was employed.  
 The inclusion of the ideological distance variable mutes the impact of divided 
government on the presidential use of executive orders when considered in their totality. 
Whereas in Table 3 the divided government coefficient estimate was negative and statistically 
significant at the .05 level, the inclusion of the ideological distance variable drops its significance 
into the .10 level as seen in column one. None of the variables in column one of Table 5, 
including ideological distance, achieves statistical significance. However, a review of the results 
reported in columns two and three reveal that the lack of significance in column one can be 
explained by the fact that there is a vast difference in the use of different types of orders under 
different circumstances.  
 As the ideological distance between the president and the median chamber member 
increases, the use of major executive orders increases by 47% and the use of symbolic and 
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routine orders decreases by 38%. The stark difference in the use of these different types of 
executive orders cancel each other out and hide their significance when executive orders are 
combined as they are in column one. Clearly, as the ideological distance between the president 
and the median Senate member increases, the president takes a more aggressive unilateral 
approach to major issues and lessens the use of minor orders.  These results support prior 
findings that suggest the president may use major executive orders as a means to accomplish 
legislative priorities in the face of an ideologically hostile Congress (Deering and Maltzman 
1999; Fine and Warber 2012). 
 The coefficient results reported in columns two and three also show that under divided 
government the president will issue fewer symbolic and routine executive orders, and there is a 
null finding for major orders. Mixed government is similar to ideological distance in that for a 
one standard deviation increase in mixed government, the president is 36% more likely to issue a 
major executive order and 58% less likely to issue a minor order. Democratic presidents are 
shown to be more likely to issue major executive orders than Republican presidents, while the 
opposite is true for symbolic and routine orders. Based on the results of this model, presidents 
are less likely to issue major executive orders when their approval ratings are high. 
 Hypothesis three suggests that as the ideological gap between the president and the 
median chamber member widens there is an increase in the issuance of major executive orders. 
For the reasons outlined above, this assumption was tested using the absolute value of the 
distance between the president and the median member of the Senate. The results support this 
hypothesis as not only did the number of major executive orders increase as the ideological gap 
widened, but the use of symbolic and routine orders decreased. In the divided government 
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model, the variable indicating the presence of mixed government represented a 48% increase in 
the use of major executive orders. The inclusion of the ideological distance variable has a 
dampening effect on the influence of mixed government as the latter’s explanatory power is 
decreased by 11% when controlling for ideological distance. This finding further supports the 
idea that the political environment impacts the president’s issuance of executive orders.   
            The models in Table 6 test the policy area based assumptions associated with hypothesis 
four. Foreign policy-based executive orders, in their totality, are not shown to be impacted by 
ideological distance; however, much like executive orders in general the results are impacted by 
differences in the president’s issuance of major and minor foreign policy-based orders. For a one 
standard deviation increase in the ideological distance between the median member of the Senate 
and the president, there is an 80% increase in the use of major executive orders. In contrast, 
when that same one standard deviation increase occurs in the ideological distance, there is a 42% 
decrease in the use of minor foreign policy-based executive orders. When addressing foreign 
policy, presidents clearly reserve the use of executive orders for major policy initiatives when 
facing greater ideological opposition.       
 Divided government is shown to be associated with a decrease in the use of foreign 
policy executive orders by 34%. This finding is similar to the 35% decrease in the model without 
the ideological distance variable. Again, much like in the model reported in Table 3, this overall 
decrease is driven by a significant reduction in the use of minor foreign policy executive orders 
under divided government (which decrease by 46% for each one standard deviation increase in 
divided government). Mixed government also is associated with a decrease in the use of 
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symbolic and routine foreign policy-based executive orders, but has no impact on the use of 
major foreign policy-based orders.  
 The pattern established with total executive orders and foreign policy-based executive 
orders continues with domestic policy-based executive orders; but the statistical significance 
levels being above conventional thresholds do not allow for any conclusions to be drawn 
confidently. The ideological distance variable is not statistically significant in relation to the 
aggregated domestic policy-based executive orders. For major domestic policy-based orders, the 
coefficient estimate is positive with a p value of .06. For minor domestic policy-based orders, the 
coefficient is negative with a p value of .07. It is possible that the ideological distance between 
the president and the median Senate member impacts the president’s use of domestic policy-
based executive orders but the coefficient estimates do not meet the traditional .05 level of 
statistical significance. Considering that ideological distance has a significant impact on the use 
of executive orders in general and in foreign policy-based executive orders, it is reasonable to 
conclude that it would have some impact on the president’s use of domestic policy-based orders 
that is why, despite higher p values, the major and minor domestic executive order variables 
warrant further evaluation. 
 Major domestic policy-based executive orders are not impacted by divided government, 
but are shown to increase by 8% under mixed government. The weak relationship between the 
ideological distance and major domestic policy-based executive orders variables combined with 
the results for the divided government and mixed government variables could indicate that 
presidents are very careful about using executive orders in this policy area. Perhaps rather than 
increasing their use of major domestic policy-based orders as Congress is more hostile, they 
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increase the use of this type of order when facing a moderately hostile Congress in which they 
still have some support. The model demonstrates that the relationship between the president and 
Congress in this policy area is quite complex and warrants further exploration. Unfortunately, the 
current model lacks the explanatory power to fully model that relationship. In the conclusion, 
some suggestions are made as to how future studies could accomplish this. 
 Unlike major domestic policy-based orders, the use of minor domestic policy-based 
orders is impacted by divided government. For one standard deviation increase in divided 
government, there is a 35% decrease in the use of minor domestic policy executive orders. Under 
mixed government, the use of these orders decreases 61%.    
 Major domestic policy-based executive orders are also shown to be used more by 
Democratic presidents than Republican presidents. Conversely, Democratic presidents are 
comparatively less likely to issue symbolic and routine domestic policy-based executive orders. 
As was the case with major executive orders and foreign policy-based orders presidents are less 
likely to issue major domestic policy-based orders when their approval ratings are high. 
 The findings in these models do not support hypothesis four. The theoretical expectation 
was that as the ideological gap increased between the president and the median chamber 
member, the president would be more likely to issue domestic policy-based executive orders. 
Not only did the data reveal that major executive orders increased in both policy areas, but that 
the use of major foreign policy-based executive orders reached relatively higher levels of 
statistical significance. This is an unexpected finding because it is assumed that Congress 
generally acquiesces to the president on foreign policy matters. It has also been argued that the 
two presidencies thesis applies to only Republican administrations (Fleisher and Bond, 1988); 
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however, that is not the case here. The presidential party variable did not reach conventional 
levels of statistical significance (unlike in the models for major executive orders and major 
domestic executive orders), indicating that both Republican and Democratic presidents 
contribute to this unexpectedly heightened use of foreign policy-based orders. The increased use 
of foreign policy-based orders by presidents of both parties when facing a comparatively larger 
ideological gap indicates that presidents will use unilateral action, regardless of policy area, 




 Within the context of prior findings, the current findings support the theoretical 
expectation that executive orders must be carefully categorized based on their individual 
characteristics, rather than considered monolithically, in order to reveal how and when presidents 
will use them. By extending Warber’s (2006) major, symbolic, and routine categories to specific 
policy areas this study supports some prior findings while demonstrating that others were likely a 
result of underspecified measurements of the concepts being studied.  
In most cases, the underspecified measurements were the result of creating variables that 
measured executive orders too broadly, thereby obscuring the underlying processes that 
influence presidential decision-making in this area. For instance, Marshall and Pacelle (2005) 
argue that the two presidencies thesis applies to the strategic use of executive orders but the 
present study demonstrates that accounting for major and minor executive orders negates the two 
presidencies argument. By accounting for major and minor orders, it is shown here that the use 
of both major foreign and major domestic executive orders increases when the president faces 
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legislative opposition. In fact, major foreign policy orders increase to a greater degree than major 
domestic policy orders when the ideological gap between the president and the median Senate 
member increases. This finding runs counter to the idea that presidents are generally given 
greater leeway in foreign policy by Congress and, therefore, would not need to resort to 
unilateral action, even when operating in an adverse political climate. It may be true that the two 
presidencies thesis is empirically valid for certain areas of government operations, such as 
budgetary appropriations and agency creation (Canes-Wrone, Howell, and Lewis 2008) however, 
in relation to executive orders, this study demonstrates that the two presidencies thesis is not 
empirically supported.  
 A key puzzle the prior studies on the president’s strategic use executive orders has 
addressed is whether divided government increases the likelihood of a president acting 
unilaterally. Divided government has generally been shown not to be predictive of an increase in 
the use of executive orders (Deering and Maltzman 1999; Mayer and Price 2002). However, 
there have been some findings that indicate divided government may matter under certain limited 
circumstances (Fine and Warber 2012; Marshall and Pacelle 2005). This study confirms the 
findings of Fine and Warber (2012) that divided government exerts a negative influence on the 
total number of executive orders a president issues, but that the finding is driven by the 
significantly large decrease in the number of symbolic and routine orders. Those orders that are 
considered to be major executive orders are not impacted by the presence of divided government, 
however.  
 This study further contributes to the divided government question by accounting for the 
presence of mixed government. Interestingly, when the president’s party controls one chamber of 
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Congress, there is an increase in the use of major executive orders. The increase in the use of 
major executive orders when the president presumably has the support of one chamber of 
Congress indicates that the president calculates the odds of success depending on the extent of 
opposition he is facing. The mixed government results support the argument of Deering and 
Maltzman (1999) that presidents will use executive orders to circumvent a hostile Congress 
unless they believe the order is susceptible to being overturned. Clearly, Congress is more likely 
to be capable of overturning an executive order under pure divided government than under mixed 
divided government.  
 The president can use executive orders for reasons other than to simply enact legislation. 
They can be used to spur action by a gridlocked Congress or to move legislation that is under 
consideration closer to the president’s ideological point of view (Deering and Maltzman 1999; 
Howell 2003). For this reason, it is expected, under the strategic model, that as the ideological 
gap increases between the president and the median chamber member of Congress, the president 
will issue more executive orders to overcome a lack of legislative success. Deering and 
Maltzman (1999) found this to generally be the case. Fine and Warber (2012) found that this 
presidential behavior was true for major executive orders. This study confirms Fine and 
Warber’s (2012) findings while extending the analysis to foreign and domestic policy.  
The results of the foreign and domestic policy models contribute to our knowledge of 
presidential use of executive orders by demonstrating the increased use of major executive orders 
is not constrained by policy area. The consistency in these findings suggests that ideological 
distance has greater explanatory power than other variables, such as divided government, mixed 
government, and seat shares in evaluating presidential use of executive orders. The advantage of 
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the ideological distance variable is that it captures potential rifts within the president’s party that 
a simple divided government variable overlooks.  
The strategic model is further supported by the outcomes of the models that include the 
ideological distance variable. Invariably, a larger ideological gap resulted in the president issuing 
fewer minor executive orders across all policy types. As the president faces greater resistance 
from Congress, and has to resort to unilateral action to promote his legislative agenda, it makes 
sense that there would be fewer symbolic and routine orders issued. The president, as a strategic 
actor, would not want to increase tensions with Congress by issuing relatively unimportant 
executive orders thereby spending limited political capital. Under these conditions the logical 
choice to make is to save the use of orders for legislative issues that are of greater importance to 
the president. The current results indicate that the president behaves in this manner when making 
a decision regarding the issuance of executive orders.                     
Krause and Cohen (1999) argue that the president’s decision to use executive orders to 
achieve legislative goals is influenced by more than the relationship between the president and 
Congress. In their estimation, there are many other factors that affect the president’s decision-
making process. This study illustrates that for certain types of executive orders, there are factors 
beyond the legislative climate that influence the president’s decision to use executive orders. As 
approval ratings increase, presidents are less likely to issue major executive orders of all policy 
types. This result supports the findings of Mayer and Price (2002), and Krause and Cohen (1997) 
that popular presidents are less inclined to issue executive orders than relatively less popular 
presidents.  
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Another factor that prior studies (Krause and Cohen 1997; Mayer and Price 2002) have 
identified as significant in explaining the use of executive orders is party affiliation. Those 
studies have argued that Democratic presidents take an activist approach to the office and are, 
therefore, more likely than Republicans to use executive orders. This study supports that 
contention to some degree. Democratic presidents do issue more major executive orders overall, 
but this is driven by the issuance of major domestic policy-based executive orders. When it 
comes to major foreign policy-based executive orders, there is no difference between 
Republicans and Democrats. This finding highlights, once again, the importance of categorizing 
executive orders as they have been in this study. Evaluating executive orders in their totality, or 
by policy area alone, does not reveal the different approaches presidents take to issuing major 
orders in the different policy areas. 
Prior studies have not evaluated the impact of major events as defined in this study; 
however, Bailey and Rottinghaus (2013), have evaluated the impact of the occurrence of a war 
on presidential use of executive orders and the source of authority that those orders invoke. They 
find that war is a predictor of the president issuing a larger number of executive orders while 
citing both presidential and Congressional sources of power (Bailey and Rottinghaus 2013). 
Their war variable is similar to the major event variable in this study with the exception of the 
earlier years that they code as being under war conditions, which include World War II and the 
early years of the Korean War, are not covered by this study. Unlike this study, Bailey and 
Rottinghaus (2013) do not include the September 11th attacks, but because they include the 
beginning of the Afghanistan War, the year 2001 is coded the same as in this study. Bailey and 
Rottinghaus’ (2013) results are likely due to the inclusion of World War II in their model. The 
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World War II era was one in which executive orders were issued with greater frequency than 
they were in later years (Howell 2003; Mayer 2001). The major event variable in this study tells 
a different story about presidential use of executive orders in the post-World War II era in that it 
rarely reaches conventional levels of statistical significance.    
In both the divided government and ideological gap models used in this study, the major 
event variable only reached statistical significance in relation to foreign policy-based executive 
orders. In both models, the coefficient estimate for that variable was negative thereby indicating 
that presidents issue fewer foreign policy-based executive orders when major events occur. For 
the other executive order categories there was no impact. This finding suggests that during major 
events, Congress is willing to acquiesce to the will of the president on issues of foreign policy. 
Because Congress is more cooperative during those major events, the president has less of a need 
to resort to executive action. However, in the case of domestic policy Congress is less obliging; 
therefore, the president’s use of executive orders is not impacted. The use of domestic policy-
based orders would not be expected to increase during these major events as the president’s 
focus would be on the foreign policy question.  
 Generally, the results of this study confirm that presidents behave strategically in their 
use of executive orders. It is that same strategic behavior that results in complications when it 
comes to measuring and testing the behavior. The president faces different constraints and, 
therefore, has to employ different strategies in different policy areas. This makes identifying the 
conditions under which a particular type of executive order (whether it is a foreign policy-based 
major executive order or a minor domestic policy-based executive order) will be employed. This 
study contributes to the scholarly advances that have been made in determining how to measure 
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executive orders by demonstrating that categories, such as major and minor executive orders 
combined with consideration for policy area, are important to understanding the president’s use 
of executive orders. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION 
 This thesis has shown that the president is more likely to issue major executive orders, in 
both policy areas, when the ideological gap between the president and Congress increases. The 
study also confirms that popular presidents are less likely to issue major executive orders, of any 
policy type, than less popular presidents. The president is also consistently hesitant to issue 
minor orders when facing increased legislative constraints. Beyond that, few factors are 
consistent predictors of the president’s use of executive orders when facing legislative 
opposition.  
There are a number of contingencies that affect the president’s decision-making process 
in varying ways across different policy areas. Under mixed government, the president is more 
likely to issue major domestic policy-based executive orders, but major foreign policy-based 
executive orders are not impacted. When a major event occurs, presidents are less likely to issue 
foreign policy-based executive orders, but there is no effect on total orders or domestic policy 
orders. Democratic presidents are more likely to issue major executive orders, but this is driven 
by an increased use of major domestic policy executive orders, as there is no difference between 
Republican and Democratic presidents when it comes to the use of foreign policy-based 
executive orders. 
Divided government had no explanatory power in relation to the president’s use of major 
executive orders. This finding demonstrates that in order to continue building valid theory 
regarding the president’s use of unilateral power, the relationship between the president and 
other political actors must be modeled with greater specificity than simple divided government 
indicators. Failing to account for different order types and policy areas is what has led, in part, to 
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inconsistent findings among prior studies regarding divided government. The lack of precise 
measurement obscured what was really happening in the data. By accounting for both major and 
minor orders, and domestic and foreign policy, this thesis shows that a decrease in minor orders 
drives any findings regarding divided government. Two other variables that have been 
considered in prior studies (election year and new president) are shown not to be statistically 
significant in this study. 
This thesis makes three significant contributions to the study of the president’s use of 
executive orders. The first is that this study confirms the value of the methodology developed by 
Warber (2006) and extended by Warber and Fine (2012). Executive orders are a vital piece in the 
construction of valid theory surrounding presidential unilateral action. Unfortunately, little 
consensus had been reached regarding the conditions under which executive orders would be 
used. Warber and Fine (2012) demonstrated that the aggregating of major orders with symbolic 
and routine orders was a major cause of these inconsistent findings. For theoretical purposes, the 
concern should be with the use of major executive orders as those are the orders that are 
designed to significantly alter the policy status quo. Because the concern of the strategic model is 
with how presidents overcome legislative opposition, the inclusion of minor orders, which do not 
really impact legislation, in the models led to inconsistent results.  
 The second contribution is that this study demonstrates that policy area does matter when 
evaluating presidential behavior in this arena. By extending Warber and Fine’s (2012) major and 
minor categories to specific policy areas, the models specified and estimated in this study show 
that the president takes a different approach in the use of foreign and domestic policy-based 
executive orders under different conditions, such as major events. It also demonstrates that 
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presidents vary their approach to foreign and domestic policy-based executive orders depending 
on party affiliation and approval ratings. This finding is the next step in theory building as it 
opens up further avenues of study, some of which will be discussed later in this chapter. 
 The third contribution this thesis makes is the determination that the president does in 
fact have to consider constraints in both domestic and foreign policy and is not given completely 
free reign by Congress in foreign policy. If the two presidencies thesis were to hold true, the 
theoretic expectation would be that the president would not have to resort to the use of major 
foreign policy-based orders when facing a hostile Congress. Conversely, it would be expected 
that the further apart Congress and the president are ideologically, the greater the need for 
domestic policy-based executive orders. This study shows that to not be the case. In fact, as the 
ideological gap between the president and Congress increases, there is a larger increase in the use 
of major foreign policy-based orders than major domestic policy-based orders. Perhaps this is 
driven by the president’s expectation that he should be getting his way in foreign policy, thereby 
leading to an increased use of those orders but that is a question for future studies to address.  
 A study of this nature is not without its shortcomings. The largest methodological 
difficulty is a result of studying the impact of ideology and divided government on the issuance 
of annual executive orders. This approach is justified in that the ideology of the political actors 
involved will have minimal variance monthly. It is also a valid approach that allows for 
consideration of all executive orders that have been issued in the time frame under consideration 
rather than using a sample, as most monthly count based studies have done. However, by using 
the annual count, a few compromises had to be made in the construction of the dataset.  
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 The first compromise was in how to handle the executive orders that presidents 
invariably issued in the last January of their term. For example, in 1977 President Ford issued 17 
executive orders and, in 2001, President Clinton issued 12. Leaving these orders as separate data 
points for the year in question would lead to problems in the regression due to the small number 
in comparison to full years. It would essentially amount to mixing monthly and yearly data. To 
overcome this problem, the orders that were issued in the last month of a president’s term in 
office, when the term was ending in January, were added to that president’s total for the 
preceding year. So, in the case of Ford, the 17 orders he issued in 1977 were added to his total 
for 1976. This solution results in the artificial inflation of the count data for some years, but it 
was the best methodological solution.  
 The second shortcoming results from the concern with approval ratings. Approval ratings 
are generally measured on a monthly basis. So, in order to compare the yearly count of executive 
orders to the president’s approval rating, an average of all approval ratings over the course of the 
year had to be calculated to represent a yearly approval rating. The problem with this method is 
that it could fail to adequately capture a short time period where maybe the president’s approval 
rating was high but he still issued a large number of orders. However, due to the large sample 
size, it is unlikely the yearly approval rating average is misrepresenting the relationship between 
executive order issuance and approval ratings. Prior studies that have been conducted using the 
monthly issuance of executive orders as a dependent variable (Mayer 1999) have come to similar 
conclusions as this study, so the yearly approval rating average, while not ideal, is adequate for 
the purposes of this thesis. 
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 Another shortcoming of this study is that while it accounts for the median Senate 
member, it does not account for the veto pivot. The veto pivots are the members of Congress 
who are ideologically positioned to sustain a presidential veto (Krehbiel 1998). This study has 
shown that presidents use executive orders more frequently as the ideological gap between them 
and Congress widens. This finding is important in understanding the president as a strategic 
actor, however; knowing the impact of the veto pivot on the president’s decision-making process 
would extend this analysis.  
There is evidence in the current study to suggest that the veto pivots influence the 
president. In the analysis of major domestic executive orders, the president is shown to issue 
more major domestic executive orders under mixed government whereas pure divided 
government has no impact. This finding could signal that, although the ideological gap is 
important, there are other considerations, such as the position of the veto pivots, that may impact 
the president’s decision to issue an executive order. It is more likely that the veto pivots would 
be favorable to the president under mixed government than divided government. Future studies 
could model this relationship, which would be another step toward defining the parameters of the 
president as a strategic actor.          
 Future studies could also account for the role of the judiciary in the president’s decision-
making process. Howell (2003) has shown that presidents take the likelihood of judicial 
challenges to their actions into consideration. Extending this analysis to the categories of 
executive orders developed in this study would be an interesting analysis of the relationship 
between the president and the judiciary on issues of foreign and domestic policy-based executive 
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orders. Again, knowing the extent of the impact of this relationship would increase our 
knowledge of the president as a strategic actor.  
 A final suggestion for future studies would be to supplement the vast amount of 
quantitative work that has been completed on this subject with qualitative case studies. Such a 
study could look at a random sample of executive orders across policy type to examine how the 
decision to use the executive order came about. Such as study could examine the following 
theoretical questions. Was it an issue that the president had been battling Congress on for months 
with little traction gained? What was the ideological composition of Congress in relation to the 
president? Were there outside factors that influenced the gridlock, decision to issue the executive 
order, or both? What happened after the order was issued? Did Congress attempt to overturn it? 
Was it challenged legally? Did another president overturn it later with another executive order? 
A case study such as this would contribute to the unilateral powers model by demonstrating how 
the issues that have been quantitatively measured play out in the real world. 
  
 66 












Figure 1 Total Executive Orders by Year. Source: Peters (2015).  












Figure 2 Total Major Executive Orders by Year. Source: Fine and Warber (2012) 
  














Figure 3 Total Symbolic and Routine Orders by Year. Source: Fine and Warber (2012) 
  













Table 1 Total Number of Executive Orders Issued by U.S. Presidents 1953-2008 
President Total Orders Percent 
Eisenhower 484 15.843 
Reagan 381 12.471 
Clinton 364 11.915 
Nixon 346 11.326 
Johnson 325 10.638 
Carter 320 10.475 
Bush, G.W. 286 9.362 
Kennedy 214 7.005 







Source: Peters  (2015). 
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Table 2 Total Number of Executive Orders by Type 1953-2008 
Executive Order Type Total Orders Percent 
Foreign policy 1019 33.35 
Domestic policy 2036 66.65 
Total 3055 100 
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Table 3 Total Executive Orders with Divided and Mixed Government Variables 
 Total Orders Major Orders Minor Orders   
Divided Government -0.22* -0.002 -0.52**   
 (0.11) (0.11) (0.19)   
Mixed Government -0.25 0.39* -0.97***   
 (0.16) (0.15) (0.27)   
Democratic President 0.001 0.45*** -0.47*   
 (0.11) (0.11) (0.19)   
Approval Rating 0.04 -1.33*** 1.15^   
 (0.37) (0.36) (0.63)   
Election Year 0.03 0.02 0.04   
 (0.10) (0.10) (0.17)   
Major Event -0.06 0.05 -0.10   
 (0.09) (0.09) (0.16)   
New President -0.10 0.06 -0.28   
 (0.12) (0.12) (0.20)   
Intercept 4.11 3.72 3.22   
 (0.23) (0.23) (0.40)   
      
N 3055 1560 1495   
Log Likelihood -490.714 -411.363 -456.744   
Χ2 7.92 35.75 15.50   
Pseudo r2 0.11 0.36 0.20   
LR test against Poisson 
Χ2 
133.87 33.36 229.94 
  
 p=.000 p=.000 p=.000   
^p<0.10; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001. Standard errors are in parentheses. Pseudo r2 derived from McFadden's 
r2.       
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Table 4 Executive Orders by Policy Area with Divided and Mixed Government Variables 








Divided Government -0.41** -0.23 -0.65** -0.13 0.10 -0.44* 
 (0.15) (0.19) (0.21) (0.13) (0.12) (0.21) 
Mixed Government -0.31 0.25 -0.87** -0.25 0.43* -1.04*** 
 (0.20) (0.25) (0.29) (0.18) (0.17) (0.30) 
Democratic President -0.20 0.13 -0.51* 0.09 0.59*** -0.43* 
 (0.15) (0.19) (0.21) (0.13) (0.12) (.21) 
Approval Rating 0.03 -1.22* 1.02 0.05 -1.33** 1.32^ 
 (0.48) (0.61) (0.68) (0.43) (0.40) (0.70) 
Election Year 0.22^ 0.18 0.20 -0.05 -0.05 -0.04 
 (0.13) (0.16) (0.18) (0.12) (0.11) (0.19) 
Major Event -0.26* -0.18 -0.26 0.01 0.14 -0.009 
 (0.12) (0.16) (0.18) (0.11) (0.10) (0.18) 
New President -0.20 -0.007 -0.43 -0.06 0.08 -0.21 
 (0.16) (0.20) (0.23) (0.14) (0.13) (0.23) 
Intercept 3.23 2.82 2.35 3.60 3.22 2.62 
 (0.30) (0.38) (0.43) (0.27) (0.25) (0.45) 
       
N 1019 492 527 2036 1068 968 
Log Likelihood -390.795 -329.049 -344.89 -458.682 -376.316 -414.603 
Χ2 12.93 14.76 14.75 6.70 33.63 14.80 
Pseudo r2 0.17 0.19 0.19 0.10 0.35 0.19 
LR test against Poisson 
Χ2 
54.14 23.94 51.91 121.40 24.65 168.57 
 p=.000 p=.000 p=.000 p=.000 p=.000 p=.000 
^p<0.10; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001. Standard errors are in parentheses. Pseudo r2 derived from McFadden's 
r2.       
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Table 5 Total Executive Orders with Ideological Distance Variable 
 Total Orders Major Orders Minor Orders   
Ideological Distance -0.15 0.38** -0.47*   
 (0.13) (0.13) (0.23)   
Divided Government -0.21^ -0.03 -0.50**   
 (0.11) (0.10) (0.19)   
Mixed Government -0.21 0.30* -0.84**   
 (0.16) (0.15) (0.27)   
Democratic President -0.007 0.50*** -0.48*   
 (0.11) (0.11) (0.19)   
Approval Rating 0.04 -1.37*** 1.12^   
 (0.36) (0.34) (0.61)   
Election Year 0.03 0.01 0.06   
 (0.10) (0.09) (0.17)   
Major Event -0.04 0.006 -0.05   
 (0.09) (0.09) (0.16)   
New President -0.09 0.05 -0.22   
 (0.12) (0.11) (0.20)   
Intercept 4.23 3.43 3.59   
 (0.26) (0.24) (0.43)   
      
N 3055 1560 1495   
Log Likelihood -489.423 -404.119 -452.318   
Χ2 9.41 47.49 21.31   
Pseudo r2 0.13 0.43 0.26   
LR test against Poisson 
Χ2 
129.83 26.78 199.49   
 p=.000 p=.000 p=.000   




Table 6 Executive Orders by Policy Area with Ideological Distance Variable 








Ideological Distance -0.06 0.58* -0.52* -0.18 0.29^ -0.45^ 
 (0.18) (0.23) (0.24) (0.16) (0.15) (0.25) 
Divided Government -0.41** -0.31^ -0.59** -0.12 0.07 -0.43* 
 (0.15) (0.18) (0.20) (0.13) (0.12) (0.21) 
Mixed Government -0.29 0.12 -0.71* -0.20 0.37* -0.92** 
 (0.21) (0.25) (0.29) (0.19) (0.17) (0.30) 
Democratic President -0.21 0.22 -0.52** 0.09 0.62*** -0.43* 
 (0.15) (0.19) (0.20) (0.13) (0.12) (0.21) 
Approval Rating 0.03 -1.23* 1.00 0.05 -1.38*** 1.25^ 
 (0.48) (0.58) (0.65) (0.42) (0.39) (0.68) 
Election Year 0.22^ 0.15 0.21 -0.05 -0.05 -0.03 
 (0.13) (0.16) (0.18) (0.11) (0.11) (0.19) 
Major Event -0.25* -0.28^ -0.19 0.04 0.11 0.03 
 (0.13) (0.16) (0.17) (0.11) (0.10) (0.18) 
New President -0.19 -0.01 -0.39^ -0.04 0.07 -0.14 
 (0.16) (0.19) (0.22) (0.14) (0.13) (0.22) 
Intercept 3.28 2.36 2.74 3.75 3.00 3.00 
 (0.34) (0.41) (0.46) (0.30) (0.27) (0.48) 
       
N 1019 492 527 2036 1068 968 
Log Likelihood -390.684 -323.417 -340.326 -457.294 -372.893 -411.285 
Χ2 13.06 21.79 20.69 8.26 38.75 19.09 
Pseudo r2 0.17 0.26 0.24 0.12 0.39 0.24 
LR test against Poisson 
Χ2 
54.07 20.57 44.00 117.65 21.93 148.74 
 p=.000 p=.000 p=.000 p=.000 p=.000 p=.000 
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